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Locke Against Himself: The Case For Re-
Evaluating the “Lockean” Concept of 
Personal Identity 
Ben Larson 
 
John Locke, when it comes to questions about 
personal identity, is chiefly concerned with how we 
determine who we hold responsible for actions 
deserving of praise and punishment.  That is to ask, 
how do we determine the identities of “people,” so that 
they may own the actions they’ve done in the past?  
Locke uses memory as the definition of personal 
identity in An Essay Concerning Human Understanding, 
yet his recipe for building a person—found in his work 
entitled Some Thoughts Concerning Education—gives 
us a different picture.  In fact, Locke’s real perspective 
on personal identity may be much closer to that of the 
contemporary philosopher Derek Parfit, an advocate of 
a broader view.  An arrival at this conclusion is 
dependant on understanding the Lockean definitions of 
person and personal identity, and his writings on 
education.  One must also understand the origins of 
Parfit’s theory of personal identity, and how it works.  
Finally, the argument that Locke misrepresents his real 
view of personal identity in An Essay Concerning 
Human Understanding will take two forms, both 
stemming from his work on educating children.  First, 
Locke believes essential character traits make up a 
person.  Second, contrary to the caricature of Locke as a 
purely nurture-centric, he believes in innate 
characteristics, and these must contribute to a person’s 
identity.  These arguments will demonstrate that 
Locke’s view of personal identity can no longer be 
viewed in terms of accepted definitions involving 
memory alone. 
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I 
 
We must take care to differentiate between “a 
person” and “personal identity.”  A person, according to 
Locke, is “a thinking intelligent being, that has reason 
and reflection, and can consider itself as itself, the same 
thinking thing, in different times and places; which it 
does by that consciousness which is inseparable from 
thinking, and, as it seems to me, essential to it.”1   To be 
recognized as a person, you must make it beyond 
simply being a member of the human species.  You 
must be rational, and capable of abstract thought in 
some form.  Personal identity, on the other hand, is 
jargon for verifying that a person, from one day to the 
next, is the same person.  For Locke, we determine 
personal identity by “the sameness of a rational being; 
and as far as this consciousness can be extended 
backwards to any past action or thought, so far reaches 
the identity of that person; it is the same self now it was 
then; and it is by the same self with this present one that 
now reflects on it, that the action was done.”2   This 
traditional definition can be captured in one word: 
memory.  If a person remembers doing an action, he is 
the same person who perpetrated that action.  If he can’t 
be made to remember it, he is not.  This is, at least, the 
view Locke presents in An Essay Concerning Human 
Understanding.  We shall see that his true belief is not 
so clear cut. 
                                                
1 Locke Human Understanding  II.27.9 (reprinted in Schick and 
Vaughn 282, emphasis added).   
2 Ibid (emphasis added).   
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Before moving on, let’s briefly examine the 
implications of this memory-driven theory of personal 
identity.  In a famous thought experiment on the subject, 
Derek Parfit writes: 
Suppose that a man aged ninety, one of the few 
rightful holders of the Nobel Peace Prize, confesses 
that it was he who, at the age of twenty, injured a 
policeman in a drunken brawl.  Though this was a 
serious crime, this man may not now deserve to be 
punished.3 
 
Locke’s response, if we are to extrapolate from An 
Essay Concerning Human Understanding, would be, 
“You are wrong, Mr. Parfit.  This man does indeed 
deserve to be punished, because the Nobel peace 
laureate is the same person at age ninety that he was at 
age twenty.  The proof?  He remembers committing the 
crime.  The Nobelist should be punished as if the crime 
had been committed yesterday.”  On the other hand, 
according to Locke’s theory, someone who doesn’t 
have a mental record of their crime should not be 
convicted.  This idea underlies the tendency in our legal 
system for passion crimes to receive lighter sentences 
than premeditated ones.  It also legitimizes the insanity 
defense.  The implications of this Lockean definition 
impact the world both theoretically and practically.  
  
II 
 
Now that we’ve examined Locke’s view of 
personal identity and its implications, let’s return to his 
definition of a person.  Rationality is the key word here.  
Since humans do not arrive from the womb with full 
rational abilities, they are not Lockean persons.  Instead, 
“children are the raw material out of which persons are 
                                                
3 Parfit Reasons and Persons 326 (reprinted in Schick and Vaughn 
275). 
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made.”4   Because of this, Locke sees education as the 
crucial process in which children are taught how to 
become persons.  This is the classic Lockean nurture 
argument, for Locke doesn’t just refer to erudition 
when he uses the word “education.” Education 
encompasses every aspect of child rearing. 5   Each 
physical and mental particular of Locke’s educational 
theory is based on the imperative that children must be 
taught to live by reason. 
The physical part of Locke’s regime is at times 
an enlightened version of “that which does not kill you 
makes you stronger.”  Locke saw youth as the time 
when the body could be fortified against harsh 
conditions later in life.  He encouraged boys6 to play 
outside instead of loafing around the house and sitting 
by the fire.  By playing outside, a boy would “accustom 
himself also to heat and cold, shine and rain; all of 
which if a man’s body will not endure, it will serve him 
very little purpose in this world.”7   Children should be 
given very little meat or beer (if any), and should only 
be allowed “good dry bread” between meals.8   Locke 
even advocated that children wash their feet in cold 
water to toughen them up!9 
                                                
4 Laine 3. 
5 Ibid (note 3).   
6 As radical as Locke’s views on education were at the time he was 
writing, Gay reminds us that Locke is no modern liberal.  For 
instance, Locke uses “boy” when referring to a child because he 
didn’t consider writing a book on educating female children.  
“Locke was, after all, addressing his little book on education to a 
gentleman, on the subject of the education of that gentleman’s son 
and in the hope that other gentlemen would read it.  It never 
occurred to him that every child [or any young girl!] should be 
educated or that all those to be educated should be educated 
alike…as for the poor, they do not appear in Locke’s little book at 
all” (Gay 12-13).   
7 Locke Education §9. 
8 Ibid §15. 
9 Ibid §30. 
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If Locke’s suggestions for the physical 
upbringing of children are based on the denial of 
sensory comforts and pleasures, his broader mental 
strategy is based on children learning to deny all their 
unfit desires using reason: 
 
It seems plain to me, that the principle of all virtue 
and excellency lies in a power of denying ourselves 
the satisfaction of our own desires, where reason 
does not authorize them.  This power is to be got and 
improved by custom, made easy and familiar by an 
early practice…children should be used to submit 
their desires, and go without their longings, even 
from their very cradles.10 
 
Since Locke’s definition of a person hinges on reason, 
it’s logical that he would emphasize this cultivation of 
reason in child rearing; after all, “The child is the father 
to the man.”11  That is, a kid becomes an adult after 
enough “person training”—training to use reason 
instead of simply caving to his desires.     
 Every part of education should teach children 
rationality.  Punishment and reward systems must 
strictly follow this criterion.  Punishments and rewards, 
in a behavioral learning sense, are tools of operant 
conditioning.  Locke’s end goal for this conditioning 
regimen is, again, to teach a child to command his 
mental and outward behavior using reason.  Some 
forms of punishment and reward dangerously subvert 
this ultimate goal.  For example, if a parent rewards his 
child with sweets for some academic feat, the parent is 
simply teaching the child to crave sugar.  The pupil 
doesn’t then study for the love of learning, but simply 
for the sensory pleasure of sweets.12  Similarly, if a 
                                                
10 Ibid §38 (emphasis added). 
11 Gay 11. 
12 Locke Education §52-3. 
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parent wantonly beats his child for a misdemeanor or 
failure, there are negative results.  The child will hold 
the parent in contempt, for children “distinguish early 
betwixt passion and reason.”13  Worse, a child will 
behave or study hard only to avoid beatings.14  Any 
animal can be motivated to avoid pain, but this fear has 
nothing to do with being rational. 
Locke recommends praise and shame instead, as 
the carrot and stick, respectively: 
 
Children (earlier perhaps than we think) are very 
sensible of praise and commendation [and 
disapproval].  They find a pleasure in being 
esteemed and valued, especially by their parents, and 
those whom they depend on.  If therefore the father 
caress and commend them, when they do well; show 
a cold and neglectful countenance to them upon 
doing ill…it will in a little time make them sensible 
of the difference; and…work more than threats and 
blows.15   
 
Not only does this strategy of behavior modification 
avoid the pitfalls of whippings and gratuitous material 
rewards, it also allows for the ability of the parent to 
rationally communicate the reason behind the 
reinforcement.  A parent might say, “I’m ashamed of 
you, son, because of X,” or “I’m proud of you, daughter, 
because of Y.”  This is an excellent example of the way 
Lockean parents should serve as models of rationality 
for their children.   
 Although Locke declares that children are 
naturally sensitive to “esteem or disgrace,” he does 
                                                
13 Ibid §77. 
14 Ibid §48.  Although Locke does recommend the rod be used 
sparingly (and preferably not at all), he does note that “there is one, 
and but one fault, for which, I think, children should be beaten; and 
that is obstinacy or rebellion” (Ibid §78).       
15 Ibid §57. 
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believe parents should take steps to ensure children will 
respond to such methods.16  “Agreeable or disagreeable 
things should accompany these different states.”17  That 
is to say, a child held in the esteem of a father might be 
entitled to candies, and might be prone to getting beaten 
if his father held him in disgrace.  In this way, a child 
satisfies his physical desires only by his “state of 
reputation;” “the objects of [a child’s] desires are made 
assisting to virtue.”18 
 Locke uses the word “virtue” here to describe 
the way a child’s current behavior is regarded by his 
parents.  But he uses the word over sixty times in Some 
Thoughts Concerning Education, with a broader 
meaning.  It is the most important of four things a father 
should take care to instill in his child: virtue, wisdom, 
good-breeding, and learning (in that order). 19   An 
examination of these traits will unravel Locke’s prior 
professed view that personal identity is wholly 
dependent on memory.  The memory thesis will be 
further assailed when the caricature of Locke as a strict 
nurturist is discarded.  First, however, we must 
understand an opposing view of personal identity: the 
Bundle Theory. 
 
III 
 
 The Bundle Theory was pioneered by David 
Hume.  He believed personal identity consisted of 
“nothing but a bundle or collection of different 
perceptions, which succeed each other with an 
inconceivable rapidity, and are in a perpetual flux and 
movement.”20  Hume rejects any sort of “featureless 
                                                
16 Ibid §58.   
17 Ibid. 
18 Ibid (emphasis added).   
19 Ibid §134. 
20 Hume 162. 
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‘I’” that stands apart from the experiences and 
perceptions a person has.  Try as he might, he could 
never “catch [himself] at any time without a 
perception;” Hume was always forced to define himself 
by “some particular perception or other.” 21   For 
instance, if you were to reflect on “who you are,” 
perhaps you might say, “I am generous.”  This would 
presumably be based on your perceptions of past events 
in which you acted generously, and not some cosmic 
“I” that has the inherent property of generosity.   
 This theory was expanded upon by Derek Parfit:   
 
According to the Bundle Theory, we can’t explain 
either the unity of consciousness at any time, or the 
unity of a whole life, by referring to a person.  
Instead we must claim that there are long series of 
different mental states and events—thoughts, 
sensations, and the like—each series being called 
one life.22   
 
Parfit agrees with Hume (and Buddhists, incidentally),23  
and the implications for his theory of identity are huge.  
By declaring that “our beliefs, attitudes, desires, values, 
and…actions” 24  are what make up what we call a 
distinct person, Parfit suggests it is not “numerical 
identity” (being the same body that did X) that dictates 
moral responsibility, but “sameness of character” 25 
(having the same beliefs, attitudes, desires, values, and 
actions as the body that did X).  Therefore, since 
Parfit’s “Reformed Nobelist” has none of the same 
characteristics as the twenty-year-old rascal who 
injured the police officer, he would not deserve 
                                                
21 Ibid. 
22 Parfit Nature of Persons (reprinted in Schick and Vaughn 292). 
23 Ibid. 
24 Schick and Vaughn 276. 
25 Ibid. 
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punishment, regardless of his memory.  Parfit’s 
conception of personal identity is at work when parole 
boards re-evaluate the character of an inmate, and in 
statues of limitations, which restrict the length of time a 
man or woman may be convicted of a crime.26  We can 
now see that Parfit’s view competes with the traditional 
Lockean view in theory as well as practice. 
 
IV 
 
 With a version of the Bundle Theory in mind, 
Locke’s four character traits begin to look very 
different.  Virtue, wisdom, breeding, and learning are 
analogous to Parfit’s list of traits that, in a bundle, form 
a distinct person.  A discussion of each of Locke’s key 
characteristics will demonstrate this.  First is “virtue,” 
which is too broad for Locke to explicitly define.27  It is 
likely a combination of manners, morals, and eveything 
else the word implies.  Locke does note that the path to 
virtue must begin with a strong belief in God. 28  
Beyond this, one should always be truthful, and good 
natured and loving toward others.29  Moving on to 
“wisdom,” Locke instructs a parent to raise his child 
with a love of truth and “worthy thoughts,” and an 
aversion to cunning and deceit. 30   Time and 
socialization will take care of the rest.  “Good-
breeding,” the third quality, is simply the opposite of 
two ill qualities: “sheepish bashfulness; and…a 
misbecoming negligence and disrespect in our 
carriage.”31  These can be avoided simply by caring for 
                                                
26 Ibid. 
27 Locke Education §139.   
28 Ibid §136. 
29 Ibid §139. 
30 Ibid §140. 
31 Ibid §141. 
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oneself and others, respectively. 32   Locke places 
“learning” last, because he believes the preceding 
attributes will make learning fall into place quite 
smoothly.33  All four traits could easily be construed as 
versions of Parfitian beliefs, attitudes, desires, and 
values.   
 We are left with Locke against Locke.  His 
writings on education apparently contradict his writings 
on human understanding.  In the latter, he clearly 
argues that personal identity is based on the faculty of 
memory.  An individual is responsible for what he or 
she can remember doing.  In his pedagogical writings, 
however, we see a much more complicated picture of 
personal identity.  A Lockean person has many traits, 
and the goal of education is to cultivate certain 
desirable qualities.  Locke implicitly argues that a 
person is defined in some way by these traits.  In any 
case, it has been demonstrated that Locke’s view of 
personal identity is more intricate than he lets in on An 
Essay Concerning Human Understanding.      
 
V 
 
 To complicate things further, Some Thoughts 
Concerning Education undermines the simplistic view 
of Locke as a puritanical nurturist, adding to the case 
against his belief in a theory of personal identity based 
on memory alone.  Most government classes paint 
Locke as “that Blank Slate guy,” and Locke certainly 
believes humans are impacted by their environment.  If 
he didn’t, he would not have written a book on 
educating them.  However, he is not as radical as he’s 
made out to be.  Here are Locke’s own words against 
the caricature: 
                                                
32 Ibid. 
33 Ibid §147 
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We must not hope wholly to change [the] original 
tempers [of people], nor make the gay pensive and 
grave, nor the melancholy sportive, without spoiling 
them.  God has stamped certain characters upon 
men’s minds, which, like their shapes, may perhaps 
be a little mended; but can hardly be totally altered 
and transformed into the contrary.34 
 
There are other similar examples.  For instance, Locke 
states that one tenth of a person’s attributes are innate, 
and that education must be suited to developing one’s 
“natural genius.” 35   It now appears impossible for 
Locke to hold that a person is distinct based on memory 
alone, for he has admitted that men have God-given 
characteristics.  Could a devout man like Locke deny 
that a trait handed down from The Almighty is an 
integral part of personal identity?  It is more likely that 
Locke’s real view of personal identity is more complex 
than usually assumed. 
   Did Locke ever arrive at a concise theory of 
personal identity for himself?  It is unclear.  He gives a 
straightforward definition in An Essay Concerning 
Human Understanding that uses memory as its gold 
standard.  But his reflections in Some Thoughts 
Concerning Education seem to reject such a simplistic 
view of identity.  What can be pieced together from 
Locke’s pedagogical writings suggest his real view of 
personal identity was much closer to Derek Parfit’s 
version of the Bundle Theory than his memorial 
definition.  This is probably a good thing for Locke; as 
we saw from Parfit’s thought experiment, the Bundle 
Theory does a better job of designating moral 
accountability.  A person, after all, is a complicated 
thing.  We should strive to define personal identity in 
                                                
34 Ibid §66 (emphasis added).   
35 Ibid §1. 
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broad terms, as Parfit does.  Locke, as I have shown, 
would probably agree. 
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